"A European perspective on regulatory instruments and enforcement in regional blocs"

[T]he purpose of this paper is to explore the relatively neglected issue of the balance between general norms and specific rules in processes of integration. In particular, the paper seeks to identify the costs that determine the choice between general rules (or norms) and narrow rules. It considers those cases where both the EC level and the Member States act and asks what may be the optimum level of generality/specificity at the EC level and the Member State level. The paper argues that integration cannot be sustained alone on general principles. It needs specific rules that would enable an implementing or enforcement authority to determine unambiguously whether an activity is harmful and therefore, proscribed or not. The paper also identifies how the balance between general and narrow rules may change over time. The analysis suggests that there are important scale and scope effects in the generation of norms and rules that lead to further norms and rules. These effects also indicate that, at least in the initial stages of integration, regulatory enforcement should be centralised. Hence, there is a dynamic process in regulation within regional blocs that over time change the optimum allocation of regulatory responsibilities between the central and the national authorities. Finally, the paper makes some speculations about the consequences of enlargement … [i]n particular, the paper argues that if enlargement will make the European Union less homogeneous, then there will be need for more, not less, centralisation. A possible resolution of this conundrum may be growth of informal arrangements of cooperation and information exchange